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Abstract
An information campaign that provided Kenyan teenagers in randomly selected schools
with the information that HIV prevalence was much higher among adult men and their
partners than among teenage boys led to a 65% decrease in the incidence of pregnancies
by adult partners among teenage girls in the treatment group relative to the comparison.
This suggests a large reduction in the incidence of unprotected cross-generational sex. The
information campaign did not increase pregnancies among teenage couples. These results
suggest that the behavioral choices of teenagers are responsive to information on the relative
risks of diﬀerent varieties of a risky activity. Policies that focus only on the elimination of
a risky activity and do not address risk reduction strategies may be ignoring a margin on
which they can have substantial impact.
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1 Introduction
Public health interventions often aim at the complete elimination of a risky behavior. Accord-
ingly, they often do not include information that would help people reduce their exposure to risk
within the practice of a risky activity. This may be due to the fear that clients would opt for the
low-risk practice of the activity rather than for complete abstinence. If, however, risk behaviors
are more elastic with respect to which of the diﬀerent practices of a risky activity to engage in,
rather than with respect to whether to engage in the activity at all, then policies that focus only
on the elimination of a risky activity may be ignoring an important margin along which people
could reduce their exposure to risk. There has, so far, been little evidence on the relative size
of these two elasticities. This paper presents empirical evidence in one setting: HIV prevention
among teenagers in a high-prevalence environment.
In sub-Saharan Africa the prevalence of HIV is considerably higher among young women
than among young men. In Kenya and Zambia, for example, prevalence in the 15-19 age group
has been found to be at least five times higher among the girls (Glynn et al. 2001).1 Recent
studies suggest that this discrepancy is due, in part, to the high incidence of consensual, unsafe
cross-generational sexual relationships – that is, unprotected sex between teenage girls and
adult men five or more years their senior.2 Men involved in these relationships, often called
"sugar daddies," are more likely to be infected with HIV than teenage boys since they have been
sexually active for longer. Thus, compared to relationships with teenage boys, cross-generational
relationships pose a higher risk of HIV infection for teenage girls. On the other hand, older men,
who typically have more income, are usually better able to provide for the teenage girl and the
baby if a relationship leads to pregnancy (Bergstrom and Bagnoli 1993). Since the distribution
of income is more readily observable than the distribution of HIV infection, adult men may
have an advantage over teenage boys in negotiating for unprotected sex. Most HIV prevention
campaigns may not reduce this advantage, since they provide information only on the average
risk (the overall prevalence) and their key message is that "Anyone can give you HIV." Though
true in essence, this message obscures the fact that in sub-Saharan Africa adult men are more
likely to have HIV than younger men.
In this paper, I argue that, when HIV prevalence among men is correlated with age, and
as a consequence with income, providing information on the average HIV prevalence in the
population without disaggregating the prevalence by age group may not reduce the risk for
young women. Providing information on the average HIV risk increases the implicit price of
1This in part because the risk of male-to-female HIV transmission is greater than the risk of female-to-male
transmission (Peterman et al. 1988). This biological factor, however, accounts for only part of the gap observed
(Gregson et al. 2002).
2Laga et al. (2001), Gregson et al. (2002), Kelly et al. (2003), Clark (2004).
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unprotected sex, causing men who are poor but low-risk (teenage boys) to be driven out of the
market, and thus increasing the proportion of richer but riskier men (adult men) in the pool of
potential partners. Consequently, fewer partnerships may be formed, but each of them is, on
average, riskier than those formed in the absence of information on HIV.
Providing information on HIV prevalence disaggregated by gender and age group, on the
other hand, could help young women reduce their risk. Information on relative risks among
potential partners would enable young women to ensure that they receive full compensation for
the actual risk they assume by engaging in unprotected sex with adult men, rather than just
for the average risk, which is lower. Those adult men who are unable to compensate young
women for the full risk would be driven out of the market, reducing the incidence of unprotected
cross-generational partnerships, and along with it new HIV infections among young women.
The total amount of sexual activity might increase, however, if teenage girls who learn that sex
with teenage boys is relatively safer decide to engage in unprotected sex with them, instead of
remaining abstinent. This might have negative public health consequences, both in terms of
teen pregnancies and in terms of lifetime HIV risk and its epidemiological implications. This
may be why most HIV prevention campaigns aimed at youths choose not to provide information
on relative risks.
I test the eﬀects of information on relative risks using data from a randomized experiment
conducted in 328 primary schools in Kenya. An information campaign conducted by an NGO
in 71 randomly selected schools provided teenagers with information on the prevalence of HIV
disaggregated by age and gender group. Teenagers in the remaining 257 schools did not receive
this information and serve as the comparison group. The randomized design ensured that there
would be no systematic diﬀerence in the prior information held by the students across the
treatment and comparison groups before the start of the information campaign. This allows
me to identify the impact of the additional information by comparing behaviors and outcomes
across groups 6 to 12 months after the intervention.
I find that the information campaign led to a 65% decrease in the incidence of pregnancies by
adult partners among teenage girls in the treatment group relative to the comparison, suggesting
a large reduction in the incidence of unsafe, cross-generational sex. The information campaign
also led to an increase in self-reported sexual activity among teenagers with partners from
within their cohort, suggesting a substitution eﬀect. But there was no increase in pregnancies
among teenage couples, since condom use also increased. Data to measure the exact impact
on the incidence of HIV infections is not currently available, but a long-term follow-up using
biomarkers of sexually transmitted infections could be conducted in the future.
These results show that the behavioral choices of teenagers are responsive to information
on the relative riskiness of potential partners. Overall, the information campaign led to an
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increase in reported sexual activity, but to a decrease in unsafe sex, suggesting that teenage
sexual behavior is more elastic on the margin of what type of sex to engage in – the choice
of partner and the choice of protection level – than on the margin of whether to engage in
sex or not. Thus, discouraging teenagers from engaging in high-risk activities might be more
eﬀective than only asking them to abstain. These results suggest that policies that focus only
on eliminating a risky activity without discussing risk reduction strategies may be ignoring a
margin on which they could have substantial impact.
Furthermore, I estimate the role of social interactions by exploiting the random variation
across secondary schools in the proportion of students coming from a treatment primary school.
This design allows me to overcome the endogeneity problem usually inherent to identification of
peer eﬀects (Manski, 1993 and 1995; Evans et al., 1992). I find evidence that the sexual behavior
of teenage girls is aﬀected by the behavior of others around them, suggesting the presence of
peer eﬀects or social norms leading to conformity in behavior, as in Hoﬀerth (1987).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the Kenyan context
and the information campaign. Section III derives the predictions of a simple model of sexual
partnership formation in the presence of risk heterogeneity and incomplete information. Section
IV describes the data and the estimation strategy. Section V presents the results and the cost-
eﬀectiveness of the program. Section VI discusses spillover and peer eﬀects, and Section VII
concludes.
2 Background and Program Description
2.1 HIV prevalence in Kenya
The principal mode of transmission of HIV in Kenya is heterosexual contact (Baltazar et al.
2001). The 2003 Kenya Demographic and Health Survey (KDHS), which included HIV testing
of survey respondents, estimated that 7% of Kenyan adults are infected with HIV (Central
Bureau of Statistics, Kenya 2004). The breakdown by age and gender group is presented in
Figure 1. The highest infection level is for women in the 25-29 age group (12.9%). Levels of
infection among young women rise quickly (3% in the 15-19 age group and 9% in the 20-24 age
group). In contrast, prevalence rises gradually with age among men, starting at 0.4% in the
15-19 age-group, rising to 2.4% in the 20-24 age-group, and reaching its peak (8.8%) in the 40-44
age group.
2.2 HIV-related knowledge among teenagers
Knowledge of the existence of HIV and its modes of transmission is widespread. Ninety percent
(90%) of Grade 8 pupils mention HIV/AIDS when prompted for sexually transmitted diseases
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and 80% declare having a relative who has HIV or AIDS or has died from AIDS (Duflo, Dupas,
Kremer and Sinei 2005). Knowledge of risk reduction strategies, however, is more limited. Only
45% of girls and 66% of boys know that condoms can protect from HIV infection, and only 29%
of girls know that older men are more likely than young men to infect them with HIV (Table 1,
Panel A).3
2.3 Sexual partnerships
At the baseline of this study in 2004, 21% of girls (aged 15.1 on average) and 48% of boys (aged
15.5 on average) enrolled in Grade 8, the final year of primary school, reported having had
sex (Table 1, Panel A). Around 6.4% of teenage girls enrolled in Grade 8 in a given year will
have begun childbearing by the end of the following year (Panel B). Though the great majority
(88%) of teen pregnancies are unplanned, the male partner will usually marry the girl, or at
least support her financially, in the event of pregnancy (Panel C). The older the male partner,
the more likely pregnancy results in a marriage. While the rate of marriage is 42% if the teenage
girl gets pregnant by a man less than 5 years older, it rises to 63% if the age diﬀerence between
partners is 5 to 10 years, and to 79% if the age diﬀerence is greater than 10 years (Panel C).
In three quarters of teen pregnancies, the partnership involves regular cash transfers from the
male to the female partner even before the pregnancy (Panel C).
Overall, 44% of teenage pregnancies are among girls whose partner is more than 5 years
older, and 10% among girls whose partner is more than 10 years older (Panel C). However,
cross-generational partnerships may be more likely to result in a pregnancy than within-cohort
partnerships. In a study conducted in western Kenya, Luke (2003) finds evidence that a larger
age diﬀerence between partners is associated with both a lower probability of condom use and
higher transfers from the male to the female partner, which suggests that, compared to teenage
boys, adult men are more willing to pay for unprotected sex with teenage girls. Thus, even
though 44% of observed pregnancies involve adult male partners, it is likely that less than 44%
of sexually active teenage girls actually have adult partners. When asked for the age of their
partners, only 2% of Grade 8 girls report having a partner older than 20, while 21% of girls
report being sexually active (Panel A). This suggests that about 10% of sexually active Grade
8 girls are involved in a sexual relationship with an adult partner. It is possible, however, that
teenage girls underreport their involvement with older men.
3This last observation is consistent with a study conducted by Longfield et al.(2002), which found that young
Kenyan women involved with older men believe that “older men are low-risk partners because they are less likely
to be promiscuous and more likely to remain faithful to younger partners and wives”.
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2.4 School-based HIV education
The Kenya Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MoEST) has integrated HIV/AIDS
education into the primary school curriculum. It includes information on the biology of HIV/AIDS,
its transmission channels, the consequences of the epidemic for families, schools, and the nation
at large, and how to care for people with AIDS. In addition, it includes a prevention section that
emphasizes abstinence until marriage, moral values, and refusal skills. The curriculum provides
only limited scope for discussing contraception or safer sex in response to student questions.
The curriculum does not include discussion of partner selection, and, while love relationships
between same-age boys and girls are discussed, cross-generational relationships (and their as-
sociated risk) are not mentioned in the textbooks. The proposed strategies to avoid infection
are to "Avoid Sex" and to "Say NO to sex before marriage".4 All sexual activity outside of
marriage, irrespective of the age of the partner, is thus considered equally risky.
2.5 The Relative Risks Information Campaign
To assess the elasticity of sexual behavior to information on the distribution of HIV by group, I
evaluate the impact of a program run by the NGO International Child Support Africa (ICS) in
Kenya. The program involved around 13,000 pupils initially enrolled in Grade 8 in 2004. Out
of a pool of 328 primary schools, 71 primary schools were chosen to participate in a Relative
Risks Information Campaign (also called the "Sugar Daddy Awareness Campaign"). Between
June and November 2004, a trained ICS oﬃcer visited each of these schools and, with the
authorization of the teachers, spoke to Grade 8 pupils for a 40-minute period. At the start
of the period, the students were asked to complete an anonymous, self-administered survey
to determine how much they knew about the distribution of HIV in the Kenyan population.5
After the survey, students were shown a 10-minute educational video on the risk of pregnancy
associated with partnerships with adult men.6 The video screening was followed by an open
discussion about cross-generational sex. During the discussion, the ICS oﬃcer shared the results
of studies conducted in Kenya and Zambia (Glynn et al. 2001) and Zimbabwe (Gregson et al.
2002) on the role of cross-generational sex in the spread of HIV.7 In particular, the ICS oﬃcer
wrote on the blackboard the detailed prevalence rates of HIV, disaggregated by gender and age
group, in the nearby city of Kisumu, a place familiar to the students, as published by the WHO
4These are quotes from the oﬃcial textbook "Let’s Talk About It", book 3 (grades 6, 7, 8), p. 26 and 19.
(Textbook produced by the Kenya Institute of Education with the financial support of UNICEF).
5The results of this survey were discussed in Section 2.3 and are presented in Table 1, Panel A.
6The animated movie, “Sara: the Trap,” was produced by ACE communications, 2000, for UNICEF.
7 In accordance with the Kenyan government policy, ICS oﬃcers did not volunteer information on condoms nor
demonstrate how to use condoms.
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in 1997 and reported in the Kenyan Government’s brochure AIDS in Kenya (Baltazar et al,
2001).8
The 328 schools involved in this study are also involved in a separate randomized evaluation
designed to test the eﬀectiveness of Kenya’s national HIV prevention curriculum for primary
schools.9 In that study, the sample of schools was stratified by location, test scores, and gender
ratio, and half of the schools were randomly chosen to receive teacher training on the HIV cur-
riculum in 2003. The training was implemented jointly by ICS, the Kenya Institute of Education
and the MoEST.10 In 2004, the 71 schools chosen for the Relative Risks Information Campaign
were selected randomly after stratifying by participation in the HIV teacher training program, as
well as by location, test scores and gender ratio. Thus, the Relative Risks Information Campaign
was implemented both in schools where teachers had been trained and in schools where teachers
had not been trained, which allows me to compare the impact of the Relative Risks Information
Campaign with the impact of the teacher training reinforcement on the national HIV prevention
curriculum. Information on the distribution of HIV infections by age and gender is typically
not given to adolescents by their teachers because it is not covered by the school curriculum
and was not included in the teacher training. Moreover, male teachers are sometimes involved
in cross-generational relationships themselves, and may not be in a position to discuss the issue
freely with their students.
3 Partner’s choice and risk information: a simple model
This section uses a simple matching model with competition between men to predict and compare
the impact of providing two types of information: 1) the average prevalence of HIV in the
population, and 2) HIV prevalence disaggregated by gender and age group.
I consider a market for sex with three groups: teenage girls, teenage boys and adult men.
There are two risks associated with sex: the risk of HIV infection for those who are not infected,
and the risk of pregnancy for girls. Both risks can be reduced by using condoms.
8The statistics provided to the students by the NGO were as follows:
Age 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-39
Female 22% 36% 35% 32%
Male 4% 13% 28% 32%
The city of Kisumu is the capital of Nyanza province, which is predominantly Luo, but the NGO program took
place in Western Province, which is predominantly Luhya. While prevalence in Kisumu is higher than in the rest
of Kenya, the ratios between male and female by age-groups and the ratios between age-groups by gender are
similar.
9This other study is conducted by Esther Duflo, Michael Kremer, Samuel Sinei and myself. See Duflo et al.
(2006).
10The KIE and the MoEST have trained a number of trainers to provide in-service courses for teachers on
HIV/AIDS education methodology. The training is phased-in over a large period of time, which allowed random-
ization at a large scale.
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In the model, a teenage girl randomly meets both a teenage boy and an adult man, but she
can start a sexual partnership with only one of them. The two males compete via prices; that
is, via the transfer to the girl in compensation for sex. Adult men diﬀer from teenage boys in
three ways. First, their group may have a diﬀerent HIV prevalence rate. Second, they have
greater financial resources. Third, they derive relatively less utility from condom-protected sex,
an assumption I motivate below.
I solve for the types of partnerships formed, for the use of condoms, and for minimum
transfers to girls, under various sets of information. I show that information that increases the
perceived average HIV prevalence might have a perverse eﬀect on the riskiness of partnerships
formed if it is not accompanied by disaggregated information on the prevalence in each group.
However, for certain distributions of the parameters of the model, disaggregated information
might have a perverse eﬀect on the amount of within-cohort sexual activity. An empirical test
is thus needed to resolve the type of information to provide in order to maximize public health
benefits.
3.1 Base case: Partnerships chosen by virgins
I consider the decision made by teenage girl G who meets teenage boy B and adult man A.
Assumptions
Everyone holds the same beliefs about each person’s preferences and HIV status, and about
the eﬀectiveness of condoms and the risk of pregnancy.
A person who gets infected with HIV incurs a cost H, but a person who infects his or her
partner incurs no cost. I ignore the harm caused by reinfection - that is, I assume that having
sex with an infected person is harmful only to the uninfected people.
Girl G is a virgin and everyone knows that her HIV risk is zero: p˜G = 0. No one knows the
HIV statuses of boy B and adult man A, but everyone holds common beliefs about them, namely,
the prevalence of HIV is p˜B among teenage boys and p˜A among adult men. For simplicity, I
assume that transmission rates from male to female or from female to male are equal. I call the
transmission rate t. For person i who has unprotected sex with person j, the expected health
cost is (1− p˜i)p˜jtH.
While the HIV risk is symmetric across gender, the cost of pregnancy is borne entirely by
women, in the absence of transfers by male partners). If G has unprotected sex, the expected
pregnancy cost is C (equal to the probability of pregnancy times the cost of rearing a child).
I assume that adult A is richer than both boy B and girl G, and that there is diminishing
marginal utility of money. As such, even if all three individuals derive the same pleasure from
unprotected sex, A’s willingness to pay for an unprotected sexual partnership is higher than B’s
and G’s. I call WA the willingness to pay of A for unprotected sex, and WY the willingness of
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G and B to pay for unprotected sex (WY < WA). Note that everyone’s reservation utility is 0.
Condoms exist and reduce both the risk of HIV transmission and the risk of pregnancy by
a factor e (0 < e < 1).11 For A and B (but not G), condom use reduces the utility from sex.
I make the simplifying assumption that adult men who select themselves into the "teenage"
market have an outside option — for example, protected sex with professional sex workers or
unprotected sex with older women, — that brings them a higher utility than protected sex with
teenage girls.12 Thus A derives zero utility from protected sex with G. On the other hand, B
derives positive utility from protected sex: condom use reduces B’s utility from sex by D < WY .
Furthermore, I assume that WY < (1− e)C, or that G is unwilling to transfer money to either
A or B for protected sex.
Partnerships
G’s payoﬀ from an unprotected partnership with A isWY − p˜AtH−C+PA, where PA is the
transfer that A makes to G. The transfer that makes G indiﬀerent between unprotected sex with
A and remaining a virgin is p˜AtH+C−WY . Thus A and G may have an unprotected partnership
as long as WY +WA ≥ C + p˜AtH. Similarly, G and B may have an unprotected partnership as
long as 2WY ≥ C + p˜BtH. Last, G and B may have a condom-protected partnership as long as
2WY −D ≥ (1− e)(C + p˜BtH).
Comparative Statics
I solve for the partnerships formed under three diﬀerent sets of information:13 "No HIV,"
where people believe that there is no HIV; "Average HIV," where people have information on
the mean prevalence in the population; and "HIV by Group," where people have information
on the prevalence in each group, namely, p˜A > p > p˜B.
Set 1: No HIV : People believe that the prevalence of HIV in the population is 0. Then:
(i) G engages in an unprotected partnership with A as long as his willingness to pay is higher
than the sum of B’s willingness to pay for condom-protected sex and the extra pregnancy risk:
WA ≥WY −D + eC.
(ii) If A’s willingness to pay is below the threshold given in (i), B’s willingness to pay for
unprotected sex is also below the threshold given in (i), and G has protected sex with B if
2WY ≥ (1− e)C +D. Otherwise she will choose to remain a virgin.
Set 2: Average HIV : People believe that the average HIV prevalence in the population is p,
11While I model e as the actual rate of protection, it is only the perceived rate of protection that will aﬀect
behavior. The perceived e may be lower than the actual e.
12 Imagine that there are two types of adult men, those who like condoms and those who don’t like condoms.
Those who don’t like condoms are more likely to look for partners whose risk of HIV infection is low (ideally,
virgins), and thus to be on the "teenage" sex market.
13Because it is not important for my purpose, I do not model the bargaining game between two partners in an
incentive-compatible partnership, and so do not solve for the division of the surplus between them (i.e., whether
the adult man makes a transfer equal to the girl’s reservation price or larger).
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and assign this average to both adult men and teenage boys; that is, p˜A = p˜B = p. Then:
(i) G engages in an unprotected partnership with A if A’s willingness to pay is large enough for
an unprotected partnership to be welfare improving (WA+WY ≥ C+ptH), and large enough to
outweigh the payoﬀ that G could get from protected sex with B (WA > WY −D+ eC + eptH).
This means that G engages in an unprotected partnership with A as long as the perceived
prevalence p is below the threshold p¯1 = min{WY +WA−CtH , WA−WY +D−eCetH }.
(ii) If the prevalence p is higher than the threshold p¯1, G engages in a protected partnership with
B as long as the perceived average prevalence is lower than the threshold p¯2 =
2WY −D−(1−e)C
(1−e)tH .
Set 3: HIV by group: People believe that the prevalence among adult men is p˜A > p and the
prevalence among teenage boys is p˜B < p < p˜A. Then:
G discriminates in price (she requests a higher minimum compensation from A than from B)
and:
(i) G engages in an unprotected partnership with A as long as the perceived prevalence among
adult men p˜A is below the threshold p¯3 = min{WY +WA−CtH , WA−WYtH + p˜B, WA−WY +D−eCtH + (1−
e)p˜B}.
(ii) If the perceived prevalence among adult men p˜A is higher than the threshold p¯3, G en-
gages in an unprotected partnership with B as long as p˜B is lower than the threshold p¯4 =
min{2WY −CtH , D−eCetH }
(iii) If the perceived prevalence among adult men p˜A is higher than the threshold p¯3, and if
the perceived prevalence among teenage boys p˜B is higher than the threshold p¯4, G engages in
a protected partnership with B as long as p˜B is lower than the threshold p¯2 (as defined above).
Considering that p¯1 and p¯3 are increasing in WA, we can infer the following proposition:
Proposition 1 For any set of true prevalence rates pA among adult men, pB among teenage
boys, and p on average such that pB < p < pA, we can solve for thresholds W¯L(p) and
W¯H(pA, pB) in A’s willingness to pay such that p¯1(W¯H) = pA and p¯3(W¯L) = p, and predict
that:
(i) If adult man A’s willingness to pay is suﬃciently large
¡
WA ≥ W¯H
¢
, neither information on
the average HIV prevalence nor information on HIV prevalence by group can deter girl G from
engaging in unprotected sex with A.
(ii) If A’s willingness to pay is suﬃcient to compensate for the average risk but not suﬃcient to
compensate for the true risk associated with cross-generational partnerships
¡
W¯L < WA < W¯H
¢
,
information on the average HIV prevalence does not deter G from engaging in unprotected sex
with A, but information on HIV prevalence by group does.
(iii) If A’s willingness to pay is suﬃciently low
¡
WA < W¯L
¢
, both information on the average
HIV prevalence and information on HIV prevalence by group deter girl G from engaging in
unprotected sex with A.
The proof is presented in the appendix. Proposition 1 implies that, as the perceived average
HIV prevalence increases, only relatively richer men are able to compensate for the increased risk,
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which decreases the total number of unprotected sexual partnerships (see Figure 2). However, if
richer men are also more likely to have HIV, each partnership formed is, on average, riskier than
before. (Pool B on Fig. 2 is smaller than Pool A, but has a higher average HIV prevalence). In
this context, informing teenage girls that the real risk associated with those men is higher than
the average risk improves their welfare: girls who have information on HIV rates by group will
not enter an unprotected relationship with an adult man unless they are fully compensated for
the associated HIV risk. If adult men cannot oﬀer adequate compensation for the risk (which is
possible since the risk is high), girls decide not to enter the market for unprotected sex with adult
men. However, providing information on HIV rates by group might not always be optimal from
the point of view of a public health-maximizing policy marker, as suggested by the following
Proposition:
Proposition 2 Providing information on the average HIV prevalence never triggers teenage
girl G to engage in unprotected sex with teenage boy B. However, providing information on HIV
prevalence by group causes G to engage in unprotected sex with B if the following three conditions
hold:
(i) adult man A’s willingness to pay is not suﬃcient to compensate for the full HIV risk¡
WA < W¯H
¢
(ii) G’s and B’s willingness to pay for unprotected sex is suﬃciently large
³
WY >
p˜BtH+C
2
´
(iii) B’s disutility from condom use is suﬃciently large compared to the eﬀectiveness of condoms¡
D
e > p˜BtH + C
¢
The proof is straightforward and derives directly from Proposition 1 and the analysis of
behaviors under Set 3 presented above. Proposition 2 implies that, if people know the average
prevalence of HIV in the population, providing additional information on HIV rates by group
might increase the amount of sexual activity between teenage girls and teenage boys, since it
leads girls to revise downwards their beliefs about the risk associated with teenage boys.
This eﬀect on within-cohort sexual activity might have negative health consequences. While
individuals fully internalize the cost of getting infected with HIV themselves, they do not in-
ternalize the fact that they might transmit the disease to others. Because of this externality, a
public health maximizing policy maker may not always want to provide information that may
increase the overall amount of sexual activity in the population.
Proposition 3 A public health maximizing policy maker may want to provide information on
the average HIV prevalence but withhold information on HIV rates by group if A’s willingness
to pay is insuﬃcient to compensate for the average risk
¡
WA < W¯L
¢
.
Proof. If WA ≥ W¯H , G engages in unprotected sex with A under both sets of information.
However, providing information on HIV prevalence by group enables G to discriminate in price
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and thus to extract full compensation for the risk she is taking, while providing information on
the average risk enables her to extract compensation only for the average risk, which is lower.
Thus providing HIV prevalence by group improves G’s economic welfare without increasing her
risk. If W¯L < WA < W¯H , providing information on HIV prevalence by group deters G from
engaging in unprotected sex with A. Consequently, G might switch to unprotected sex with
B, but her risk decreases compared to when she only receives information on the average HIV
prevalence, which does not deter her from engaging in unprotected sex with A. Thus providing
HIV prevalence by group decreases G’s risk. If WA < W¯L, G refuses to engage in unprotected
sex with A under both sets of information. However, providing information on HIV prevalence
by group increases the likelihood that G engages in unprotected sex with B, thus increasing her
health risk compared to providing information only on the average HIV prevalence.
Thus, for a given set of prevalence rates (p, pA, pB ), the overall impact of providing infor-
mation on HIV prevalence by group compared to providing only information on the average
HIV prevalence will depend on the distributions of WA, WY , D and C, that is, on the pro-
portions of matches in each case highlighted above. In Section 5, I examine these comparative
statics empirically in Kenya and measure the eﬀects of HIV-rate information on the incidence
of cross-generational sex, condom use, and transfers to girls.14
3.2 Extensions
3.2.1 Predictions for non-virgins
Non-virgin girls who receive information on prevalence rates will update their beliefs about their
own probability of infection to pG = 1 − (1 − tp˜A)n − (1 − tp˜B)m, where n is the number of
unprotected intercourse with past adult partners and m the number of unprotected intercourse
with past teenage partners. This means that an increase in the perceived prevalence among
potential partners will be mitigated by a decrease in non-virgin girls’ cost of HIV infection
(since they are more likely to be already infected). In particular, for teenage girls who had
adult partners in the past (henceforth Type 1), learning that the true prevalence among adult
men (p˜A) is higher than previously thought might not necessarily increase the marginal cost of
engaging in unprotected sex with an adult man. That is, if they believe that their probability
of infection is very high (because they have had many adult partners in the past), they might
(rationally) become fatalistic and increase their activity on the market for unsafe sex. For those
who have had fewer adult partners in the past and do not become fatalistic, the additional
information will increase the cost of unprotected sex with adult men but to a lesser extent than
14While I do not have data on cash transfers, marriage likely represents a transfer from the man to the woman,
so I examine marriage rates. Polygamy is legal in Kenya, and a bride-price is typically paid by the groom to the
family of the bride.
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for virgins or for girls who only had a teenage partner in the past (Type 0). Thus, providing
disaggregated information on HIV rates will have a larger impact on Type 0 than on Type 1
girls, and the pool of teenage girls who are willing to engage in unprotected sex with adult men
will become smaller but riskier on average. On the other hand, adult men and teenage boys will
also update their beliefs about the riskiness of Type 1 girls, and so decrease their willingness
to pay for unprotected sex with them. Overall, the provision of disaggregated information on
prevalence rates in the presence of complete information on the sexual histories of girls may have
a negative impact on Type 1 girls insofar as they will only be able to match with very risky
partners.15
3.2.2 Incomplete information on the sexual history of teenage girls
I have so far assumed that everyone knew the sexual histories of teenage girls; that is, whether
a particular girl is a virgin (Type 0) or has had adult partners (Type 1). If, instead, I assume
that people cannot infer information on the sexual history of a girl from the price at which she
is willing to engage in unprotected sex (for instance, because girls are heterogeneous in their
disutility for pregnancy), then providing information on the average prevalence will reduce the
willingness of teenage boys and adult men to pay for unprotected sex with teenage girls, which
is likely to reduce the overall amount of unprotected sexual activity in the population.
In this context, providing disaggregated information could create a market for lemons (Ak-
erlof, 1970). Men who learn that some teenage girls are Type 1 but do not know their identity
are less willing to pay for unprotected sex. Type 0 girls will withdraw from the market for
unprotected sex if men’s willingness to pay falls too low. This will increase the average infection
rate in the pool of teenage girls willing to engage in unprotected sex, and thus further reduce
men’s willingness to pay. Eventually the market for unprotected sex with teenage girls may
collapse.
3.2.3 General equilibrium eﬀects
The model looks only at the market for sex with teenage girls. To fully assess the epidemiological
consequences of providing information on HIV risk by group, it would be necessary to look at
general equilibrium eﬀects. In particular, one should address the question of what becomes of the
adult men who are turned down by informed teenage girls. On one hand, they might reduce their
sexual activity. On the other hand, they might become fatalistic (Kremer, 1996) and engage
in unprotected sex with commercial sex workers, which could have negative epidemiological
15 If HIV testing is available, high-risk types who turn out negative will be able to match with low-risk partners.
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consequences. I do not study this issue in this paper, as I do not have data on adult men’s
behavior.
4 Evaluation Strategy and Data
4.1 Evaluation Strategy
The randomized design of the information campaign provides a straightforward source of iden-
tification. Random assignment of schools to the treatment and comparison groups ensures that
the schools in either group are similar in all other respects except in that treatment schools were
exposed to the program. Table 2 shows the pre-treatment school averages for a series of school
and pupils outcomes. Except for class size, which is lower on average in treatment schools, all
other diﬀerences in pre-treatment averages are small and insignificant. Furthermore, since the
information campaign was unannounced and conducted in the middle of the school year, stu-
dents could not self-select into or out of the treatment group. Thus, the treatment status of a
student is not correlated with her observed or unobserved characteristics. Given this, the eﬀect
of the information campaign can be measured by comparing outcomes of students in treatment
schools to those of students in comparison schools.
4.2 The Sample
The Relative Risks Information Campaign was phased into the 71 treatment schools over 4
months, from July to October 2004.16 In November 2004, students in Grade 8 took the Kenya
Certificate of Primary Education (KCPE) exam, the gateway exam to secondary school. Those
students who had performed well on the exam and whose family could aﬀord the tuition began
secondary school in February 2005.
Hereafter I call all students who were enrolled in Grade 8 at the time of the Relative Risks
Information Campaign (that is, in 2004) the "treatment cohort", and all students who were
either a year ahead or a year below are considered as part of the "control cohorts". I call
"treated students" those in the treatment cohort who come from a treatment school. There are
about 13,000 teenagers in the treatment cohort, and 2,500 of them were treated. All students
in the treatment cohort were followed-up in 2005. Even though most of them had left primary
school at the time of the follow-up, information on their whereabouts could still be collected at
their primary school of origin. Table 3 shows information on their status in July 2005, averaged
by school and broken down by gender and treatment status. At that time, the schooling status
of teenagers in the treatment group was not significantly diﬀerent to that of teenagers in the
16The school year in Kenya starts in January and ends at the end of November.
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comparison group (Column 3). Almost half of the sampled teenagers were enrolled in secondary
school, 26% to 29% were out of school, and the others were repeating Grade 8 (Columns 1 and
2).
4.3 The Data
Three types of data were collected: (1) self-reported sexual behavior, (2) childbearing and marital
status, and (3) characteristics of sexual partners of the girls who had started childbearing. Data
on the HIV status of teenagers in the sample is presently unavailable.
4.3.1 Self-reported sexual behavior
To measure the impact of the information campaign on the behavior of teenagers after they left
primary school, a post-survey was administered to all students enrolled in a secondary school
in the study area between May and July 2005, about 7 to 9 months after the intervention. The
survey included questions on sexual activity, characteristics of sexual partners, condom use, and
primary school of origin, to identify the treatment status of each student. Summary statistics
on the characteristics of the survey respondents are presented in Table 4. Overall, 55% of the
secondary school students who completed the post-survey came from a primary school that
participated in the study (10% from a treatment primary school, and 45% from a comparison
primary school). Enumerators also collected data on observable school characteristics, such as
total enrollment, average performance of students on the national exam, tuition, gender ratio,
and location.
Teenagers who joined secondary school may not be representative of all teenagers. In Kenya,
only students with suﬃcient financial resources and with high enough scores at the primary
school exit exam can go to secondary school. For this reason, out-of-school teenagers were asked
to come to their former primary school for a half-day in March 2005 to complete a post-survey
similar to the post-survey administered in secondary schools. Summary statistics presented in
Table 4 show that, as expected, out-of-school respondents were older, came from poorer families
and were more likely to be orphans than secondary school respondents. Only 50.2% of the
out-of-school teenagers sampled for the survey participated in the survey.17 Because those who
complied are likely to diﬀer from those who did not, the out-of-school survey data is likely to
suﬀer from large selection biases and cannot be use for the evaluation.18
17Compliance was higher among boys than among girls (56.4% versus 43.3%).
18There are two potential selection biases. First, teenagers who left their home village to go and work in town
are probably underrepresented, though this selection bias should be similar in the treatment and comparison
groups. Second, girls who are pregnant or got married are also likely to be underrepresented. If the treatment
aﬀected the incidence of childbearing, this would bias the estimate of the treatment eﬀect on the adoption of safer
behaviors upwards (since out-of-school girls who did not get pregnant are more likely to be abstaining or using
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In addition to attrition biases, self-reported data on sexual behavior may suﬀer from re-
porting biases. Indeed, self-reported sexual behavior has been found to be often inconsistent
with biological outcomes (Gersovitz et al. 1998). For example, in a study conducted in West-
ern Kenya, Glynn et al. (2001) found that 12% of women who reported being virgins were
HIV-positive (and some had other sexually-transmitted infections, making it unlikely that they
acquired HIV non-sexually). Relying solely on self-reported behavior to estimate the impact of
the information campaign could thus be misleading, particularly if the campaign changed the
patterns of the reporting bias in the treatment relative to the comparison group. For this reason,
I look at a biological outcome - childbearing.
4.3.2 Childbearing and marriage status
In addition to being interesting in itself, childbearing is a good proxy for risky sexual activity
among primary school girls, as some measures that prevent HIV transmission, such as abstinence
and condom use, also prevent pregnancy. Information on childbearing and marital status was
obtained for all girls in the sample during three visits to each treatment and comparison school
in the 12-month period following the intervention. At each visit, the list of all students on the
2004 enrollment form was read aloud to pupils enrolled in upper grades in 2005, and for each of
the students on the form, the following questions were asked: Is Gladys still in school? If yes,
in what grade? In what school? Does she still live in the area? Is she married? Does she have
any children? If so, how many? How old is her first born? Is she pregnant? 19
Childbearing is a good but imperfect proxy for risky sexual behavior. Certain practices,
such as abortion and anal sex, reduce the correlation between the incidence of childbearing and
the risk of HIV infection. Since it can be used as a substitute for contraception, abortion is of
particular concern for the evaluation of the Relative Risks Information Campaign. Pregnancy
by a teenage boy is less likely to result in marriage or child support, as seen in Section 2.3. As
such, teenage girls who get pregnant might be more likely to abort if the father of the child is
another teenager. If the information campaign increased the incidence of unprotected sex with
teenage partners, it might also have increased the incidence of abortion in the treatment group.
A comparison of the incidence of childbearing across groups would, therefore, overestimate the
program impact on the incidence of unprotected sex. Data on abortion rates is unavailable, so I
compare mortality rates among girls across groups. Since abortion is illegal in Kenya, abortions
condoms).
19This technique of collecting childbearing and marital outcomes generates accurate data. Among a subsample
of 282 teenage girls that were tracked at their home and interviewed, 88% of those who were reported as having
started childbearing by their former schoolmates had indeed started childbearing, and 92% of those who were
reported as not having started childbearing had indeed not started. The accuracy rates were similar in the
treatment and comparison groups.
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that do happen tend to be so unsafe that they often result in maternal death.20 I find that the
mortality rate among girls between July 2004 and July 2005 was similar across groups (0.08%).
This suggests that the incidence of abortion is not greater in the treatment group than in the
comparison group, and thus, that it is reasonable to use childbearing data to estimate the eﬀect
of the information campaign on risky sexual behavior.
4.3.3 Age of partners of girls who have begun childbearing: Home Follow-up Visit
Another reason why the incidence of childbearing is not a perfect proxy for the risk of HIV
transmission is that an adolescent girl who has a long-term relationship with one partner is less
likely to get HIV but more likely to get pregnant compared to an adolescent girl who has several
short-term relationships. To better understand the circumstances surrounding teen pregnancy,
enumerators conducted a home follow-up visit with female students who had been reported to
have started childbearing by July 2005. This home follow-up included questions on the child’s
father (his age, marital status, and the transfers, if any, he had made before and after the
pregnancy) in order to identify pregnancies that resulted from a cross-generational relationship.
Even though it is self-reported, this data is much less likely to suﬀer from reporting biases than
the behavior survey administered in school for two reasons. First, once a teenage girl is pregnant
or has given birth (and so is already out of school), she is much less likely to hide her sexual
activity or to hide information about her partner. Second, the interview was conducted by a
female enumerator in the confidentiality of the respondent’s house.
4.4 Reduced form regressions
To estimate the impact of the intervention, I use simple reduced form regression specifications.
Denote Yisc the outcome of individual i formerly enrolled in school s in cohort c. TreatSchools
is the treatment status of school s and TreatCohortc the dummy for being in the treatment
cohort. HIV curriculums is a dummy equal to 1 if school s received the teacher training on the
HIV curriculum.
First, I estimate the simple diﬀerence (SD) in means by ordinary least squares with clustering
at the school level. The model is a linear probability model :
Yis1 = α1 + β1 × TreatSchools + χ1 ×HIV curriculums + I 0iγ1 + εis
where Ii is a vector of controls for individual characteristics. The average eﬀect of coming from a
treatment school (TreatSchools = 1) versus a comparison school (TreatSchools = 0) is captured
20Unsafe abortion is a leading cause of maternal deaths in developing countries (Grimes, 2003). Up to 50% of
maternal deaths in sub-Saharan Africa are due to induced abortion (Rogo, 1993).
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by β1. Since TreatSchools = 1 was randomly assigned, we should expect E(εis|TreatSchools) =
0 so that the estimator of β1 is unbiased. The average eﬀect of coming from a school that received
the teacher training can be captured by χ1. Since HIV curriculums = 1 was randomly assigned,
we should expect E(εis|HIV curriculums) = 0 so that the ordinary least squares estimator of χ1
is also unbiased. By comparing β1 and χ1, I can thus compare the impact of the two information
sets.21 To increase the precision of the estimators, I control for the observable characteristics of
the primary school of origin (for the childbearing data) and for the characteristics of the current
secondary school (for the behavioral survey).
Second, I estimate the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DD) when data on a control cohort is avail-
able:
Yisc = α2 + β2 × TreatSchools × TreatCohortc
+δ × TreatCohortc + θ × TreatSchools
+χ2 ×HIV curriculums + I 0iγ2 + ωisc
Comparing the single-diﬀerence to the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimates is useful for two
reasons. First, if the randomization was not perfect, the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences will adjust for
potential pre-existing random diﬀerences between treatment and comparison schools. Second,
the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences allows the inclusion of school fixed eﬀects (either primary school fixed
eﬀects or secondary school fixed eﬀects, depending on the data set), which allows to control for
unobservable school characteristics. However, the double-diﬀerence estimates could be biased
in the presence of treatment spillover across cohorts. This issue should be kept in mind while
analyzing the results.
When the outcome is binary, I also estimate the eﬀect of the program on the probability
that the outcome occurs using a Logit model:
Pr(Yis1 = 1) = [1 + e
−(α3+β3×TreatSchools+χ3×HIV curriculums+I0iγ3+κis)]−1
5 Results
5.1 Impact on Incidence of Teen Childbearing
Table 5, Columns 1 to 4 show the estimates of the treatment eﬀect on the incidence of childbear-
ing with four diﬀerent regression specifications: the simple diﬀerence with a linear probability
21Considering the low incidence of childbearing, the sample size does not provide enough power to estimate the
eﬀect of the interaction between the two programs.
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model (OLS); the simple diﬀerence with a Logit model; the OLS estimate of the diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences; and the OLS estimate of the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences with school fixed eﬀects. The
information campaign reduced the incidence of childbearing by 1.7 percentage points among
treated girls relative to girls in the comparison group (Table 5, Column 1). The childbearing
rate in the comparison group is 5.4%, and thus the treatment eﬀect corresponds to a 31% de-
crease in the incidence of childbearing. The sign and magnitude of the eﬀect are robust to all
specifications. In the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences without school fixed eﬀects, the estimate of the
coeﬃcient for "Treatment School" is close to zero, confirming the absence of ex-ante diﬀerence
between treatment and comparison schools (Column 3, Row 1).
Table 5, Columns 5 to 12, show estimates of the treatment eﬀect on childbearing broken down
by marital status. The bulk of the decrease in the incidence of childbearing in the treatment
group corresponds to a decrease in childbearing outside of marriage (unmarried childbearing
decreased by 60%), while the incidence of childbearing within marriage decreased only slightly
and not significantly. This means that the proportion of girls who are married among girls
who started childbearing is significantly larger in the treatment group than in the comparison
group. Since women typically receive greater financial support from their partner when they
are married than when they are not, these findings are consistent with the model presented in
Section 3, and suggest that, relative to girls in the comparison groups, treated girls are more
likely to refuse to enter into an unprotected sexual relationship with an adult man unless they
get compensation commensurate with the higher risk involved.
The teacher-training on the HIV curriculum had no impact on the incidence of childbearing
(Table 5, Row 3). This despite the fact that the training had a large impact on the amount
of HIV education delivered in schools and increased scores of pupils on HIV knowledge tests
(Duflo et al. 2005). This result may reflect the fact that the curriculum promotes abstinence
until marriage as the only way to avoid HIV infection, and so would not deter teenagers from
marrying and having children at a young age.
5.2 Types of Pregnancies Averted
To determine the extent to which the observed decrease in the incidence of childbearing in the
treatment group corresponds to a decrease in the incidence of unprotected sex with adult men,
I look at the age diﬀerentials between girls who have started childbearing and their partners.
The data is available for two cohorts: the treatment cohort (Grade 8 of 2004) and one control
cohort (Grade 7 of 2004). Since the information campaign reduced the incidence of childbearing
in the treatment group, the data is available for diﬀerentially selected subsamples of each group.
Nevertheless, the ratio of cross-generational to intra-generational pregnancies should be the same
across subsamples, unless the treatment had an eﬀect on age diﬀerentials between partners.
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The dependent variable in Table 6, Columns 1 and 2, is the age diﬀerence between the
respondent and her baby’s father. The treatment eﬀect is negative and significant: among girls
who had begun childbearing, the average age gap with the baby’s father is 1.75 years smaller for
treated girls compared to girls who did not receive the treatment (Column 1). The coeﬃcient
in the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences specification is even larger (Column 2).22 In Columns 3 to 5, the
dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the baby’s father is more than 5 years older
than the teenage girl. The coeﬃcient of the treatment eﬀect is negative and large (23 percentage
points), and significant at the 95% confidence level (Column 3). These results contrast with the
insignificant impact of the teacher training on the national HIV curriculum (Row 4).
Table 7 shows the share of cross-generational pregnancies among all averted pregnancies. I
consider a normalized case in which 100 pregnancies occur in the comparison group. Of these,
47.6 are by adult men. In the treatment group, we observe 68.6 pregnancies, 16.7 of which
by adult men. Thus, the Relative Risks Information Campaign averted 30.9 pregnancies by
adult partners in the treatment group. This means that the incidence of cross-generational
pregnancies declined by 64.8% in the treatment group relative to the comparison group, while
intra-generational pregnancies remained stable. Overall, 98% of averted pregnancies would have
been by adult partners.
These results suggest that providing teenagers with information on relative risks led to a
large decrease in the incidence of unprotected sex between teenage girls and adult men, but did
not lead to an increase in the incidence of unprotected sex between teenage girls and teenage
boys. This strongly suggests that the information campaign has reduced the teenagers’ exposure
to the risk of HIV infection. In contrast, the HIV curriculum training had no impact on the
incidence of childbearing by adult partners, that is, did not reduce the incidence of unprotected
sex with adult men. The diﬀerential impact of the two information sets is consistent with the
model presented in Section 3, and suggests that adult men have enough resources to compensate
teenage girls for the average risk of HIV infection, but not for the actual risk that adult men
pose.
5.3 Cost-Eﬀectiveness of the Relative Risks Information Campaign
The information campaign reached about 1, 300 girls and 1, 400 boys in 71 schools and cost
less than US$2, 000 (Table 8, Panel A). The campaign reduced the incidence of childbearing
by 1.7 percentage points in the treatment group, which means that a total of 22 (1, 300 × 1.7)
22Using outcomes for the post-treatment cohort as a baseline group, however, could lead to an overestimation of
the eﬀect of the program if the intervention led to a crowding-in of adult men with younger cohorts, as suggested by
the coeﬃcients of the "Treatment School" dummy in the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences specificiations (Row 1, Columns
2, 5 and 8).
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pregnancies were averted thanks to the program. All of these (98%, see Section 5.2) would have
resulted from a cross-generational partnership. Thus, the overall cost per cross-generational
pregnancy averted is US $86.
To calculate the cost per HIV infection averted, I need an estimate of the ratio of the risk of
HIV infection to the risk of cross-generational pregnancy, a ratio which is not available in the
literature. Instead, I compute cost-eﬀectiveness estimates using three hypothetical ratios: 5/100,
15/100, and 25/100.23 Panel B in Table 8 shows the cost per HIV infection using these ratios.
For a ratio of 15/100, US $86 per cross-generational pregnancy averted corresponds to a cost of
US $576 per primary HIV infection averted among teenage girls (Scenario 2). It is important to
note, however, that these estimates consider only primary cases of HIV transmission, and thus
do not include averted secondary HIV infections (i.e. transmission to subsequent sex partners).
The next step in the evaluation of the epidemiological impact of the information cam-
paign will be to conduct a follow-up study using biomarkers (such as HSV2 and HIV tests)
in 2007/2008. By that time, the incidence of sexually transmitted infections in the sample
might be high enough to detect a diﬀerence between the treatment and the comparison with the
current sample size.
5.4 Impact on Self-reported Sexual Behavior
Did the decrease in the incidence of childbearing by adult partners come from an increase in
condom use within cross-generational partnerships or from a decrease in the number of cross-
generational partnerships? If teenage girls in the treatment group did not engage in partnerships
with adult men (high-risk option), did they substitute towards teenage boys (low-risk option)
or towards abstinence (zero-risk option)? Data to answer these questions is unavailable. As I
mentioned in Section 4.1.1, self-reported data on the sexual behavior of out-of-school teenagers
could not be collected due to large compliance biases. However, self-reported data are available
for teenagers who joined a secondary school in the study area. This subgroup is not repre-
sentative of all teenagers in the sample.24 Nevertheless, studying the impact of the Relative
Risks Information Campaign on the self-reported sexual behavior of secondary school students
is interesting in itself and can provide partial answers to these questions.
The first three columns of Table 9 presents the estimates of the treatment eﬀect on self-
23The Kenya antenatal surveillance sites recorded HIV prevalence rates in pregnant women between 12 and 35
percent in 2002 (Baltazar et al. 2001).
24Girls enrolled in secondary school have a higher incentive to avoid childbearing than girls who are out of
school, since childbearing is often not compatible with schooling. As such, the sexual behavior of secondary
school girls may diﬀer substantially from that of out-of-school girls. Similarly, out-of-school boys are more likely
to be working, and thus may have more income than secondary school boys, which may raise their ability make
transfers to girls in return for sex.
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reported sexual activity. The results of three specifications are shown: the OLS estimate of the
simple diﬀerence (Column 1); the Logit estimate of the simple diﬀerence (Column 2); and the
OLS estimate of the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences with school fixed eﬀects (Column 3). Panel A shows
the coeﬃcient estimates for girls and Panel B shows the estimates for boys.
The Relative Risks Information Campaign led to an increase in the proportion of teenagers
who report being sexually active. While 16% of girls coming from comparison schools report ever
having had sex, the treatment increased this proportion by 8.6 percentage points, an increase of
more than 50% over the comparison group (Table 9, Panel A, Column 1). This result is robust to
the logit and to the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences specification. In the terms of the model developed in
Section 3, this result suggests that the information campaign decreased the perceived riskiness
of teenage boys, and therefore some girls who were abstinent before the campaign decided to
enter the market for sex with teenage boys.
While 51% of boys coming from comparison schools report ever having had sex, 63% (0.51+
0.12) of treated boys report ever having had sex (Table 9, Panel B, Column 1). This corresponds
to a 24% increase, also robust to all specifications. Assuming that the information campaign led
treated boys to update their beliefs on the prevalence of HIV among teenage girls upwards, the
increase in the sexual activity of treated boys suggests that boys discriminate between Type 0
and Type 1 girls (as defined in Section 3.2.1), otherwise they would have reduced their willingness
to pay for all girls and their overall sexual activity would have decreased.
In contrast, training teachers on the national HIV curriculum decreased the likelihood that
teenagers report being sexually active. Girls who were enrolled in a primary school that partic-
ipated in the training program are 3.8 percentage points less likely to report they ever had sex
(Table 8, Panel A, Row 3, Column 3). This diﬀerence is significant at the 90% confidence level
and corresponds to a 25% decline. Among boys, the eﬀect is also negative, although smaller and
not significant. These self-reported diﬀerences in behavior, however, are not consistent with the
lack of impact on childbearing rates.
Table 9, Columns 4 through 9 show estimates of the treatment eﬀect on sexual activity
broken down by ever use of condoms. The increase in sexual activity for both boys and girls
does not correspond to an increase in unsafe sexual activity: the share of teenagers who ever had
sex but never used a condom did not increase significantly (Columns 4 to 6). Rather, the bulk
of the increase in sexual activity was matched by an increase in condom use (Columns 7 to 9).
Since the Relative Risks Information Campaign neither emphasized nor demonstrated condom
use, this result suggests that teenagers know how to use and where to find condoms.
The observed increase in self-reported sexual activity by both treated girls and treated boys
could, in part, be due to reporting biases. First, teenagers who openly discussed the issue of sex
with an oﬃcer from the implementing NGO in 2004 may be more likely to open up when the
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NGO oﬃcer returns with a survey 6 months later. Second, treated girls may be less likely than
other girls to hide that they are sexually active if being involved with a partner from within
one’s cohort is more socially acceptable than being involved in a cross-generational relationship
and if the treatment induced girls to switch from adult partners to teenage partners. Since the
treatment did not increase childbearing by teenage couples, the hypothesis of a reporting bias is
very plausible. More generally, self-reported data are always susceptible to endogenous reporting
biases. This underscores the importance of collecting other data that cannot be manipulated by
individuals, such as childbearing rates or biological markers of sexually transmitted infections.
6 Spillover Eﬀects
6.1 Measuring spillover eﬀects
Section 5.4 showed that the information campaign increased self-reported sexual activity among
secondary school students who previously attended a treatment school. This change in behavior
among the treated might have had an impact on the behavior of their untreated classmates
(Hoﬀerth 1987, Sacerdote 2001). To measure the importance of such spillover eﬀects, I use the
variation in the density of treated students across secondary schools.
In May 2005 (six months after the information campaign), almost half (46%) of the teenagers
in the sample were enrolled in Grade 9, the first year of secondary school. Once in secondary
school, they were mixed with students from various primary schools.25 In each secondary school,
I distinguish three types of Grade 9 students: (1) students who previously attended a treatment
primary school (T ); (2) students who previously attended a comparison primary school (C); and
(3) students who attended an unsampled primary school (U) (i.e., a primary school outside the
pool of 328 schools included in the study). T and C students are part of the study sample, or
baseline, while U students are not in the study sample. For students who did not receive the
information on relative risks (C and U students), the intensity of the interaction with students
who received the information (T students) can be measured by the proportion TT+C+U . This
proportion, however, is likely to be correlated with school characteristics. For example, better
performing secondary schools are likely to attract students from far away, and thus may have a
higher ratio of non-baseline students (U) over baseline students (T + C).
To overcome this problem, I use the proportion TT+C as an instrument for
T
T+C+U . Because
of the random assignment of primary schools to the treatment and the comparison groups, the
variation in the proportion TT+C can be considered exogenous, assuming that (1) the intervention
did not aﬀect the decision to attend secondary school, and (2) the intervention did not aﬀect
25The ratio of primary schools to secondary schools in western Kenya is about 4 to 1.
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the choice of a secondary school. Information on the current schooling status of teenagers in
the sample suggests that the first assumption above is true: at the time of the secondary school
survey, 44% of both treated and comparison girls were enrolled in secondary schools (see Table
3). The second assumption is also reasonable: the intervention took place shortly before the
KCPE exam (the primary school exit exam), and admission into a specific secondary school
depends primarily on the student’s score at the KCPE, as well as the financial resources of the
parents.
Because the HIV Curriculum Training Program had a small negative impact on sexual ac-
tivity, I also include the proportions of girls and boys coming from schools that were sampled
for the training on the right-hand side (i.e. HIVgHIVg+nonHIVg+Ug and
HIVb
HIVb+nonHIVb+Ub
). Since the
variation in these proportions is not exogenous either, I instrument them with HIVgHIV g+nonHIVg
and HIVbHIVb+nonHIVb .
6.2 Spillover Results
The change in behavior among the treated may have impacted the behavior of their peers in
two main ways. First, through peer eﬀects: if there is social learning or peer pressure, the
behavior of treated students is likely to aﬀect the behaviors of their schoolmates of the same
sex. To capture the role of such social interactions, I use the predicted proportion of treated
among sampled classmates of the same sex as an independent variable (for girls: \TgTg+Cg+Ug ; for
boys: \TbTb+Cb+Ub ).
Second, price (or market) eﬀects: if there is a change in the transfer that treated girls (treated
boys) are requesting (resp., willing to pay) for unprotected sex, this will change the probability
that boys (resp. girls) who meet treated teenagers engage in sex. To capture these eﬀects, I use
the predicted proportion of treated students among sampled classmates of the opposite sex as
an independent variable. If, however, there are cross-gender peer eﬀects, the data available do
not allow to disentangle these eﬀects from price eﬀects.
The results are presented in Table 10. I report the results of both the OLS and two-stage
least squares (IV-2SLS) regressions.
6.2.1 Peer Eﬀects
I find a clear contrast between genders with regards to peer influence. While girls’ behavior
seems substantially informed by the behavior of other girls, boys do not seem to be aﬀected by
the behavior of other boys around them. The results in Column 2 can be interpreted as follows:
a teenage girl who is in a school where the share of treated girls is equal to the average (0.14) is
10 percentage points more likely to report having ever had sex than a girl who is in a school with
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no treated girls (Panel A, Row 1, Column 2: 0.14× 0.739 = 0.10). This diﬀerence is significant
at the 99 percent confidence level. This eﬀect suggests a high level of conformity in behavior
among girls, which can be understood either through a social learning eﬀect (non-treated girls
learned that teenage boys are low-risk by observing that treated girls had teenage boyfriends)
or as a norm eﬀect (non-treated girls are more likely to have or to report having a teenage
boyfriend since it became more common).
In contrast, a teenage boy who is in a school where the share of treated boys is equal to the
average (0.12) is 4 percentage points less likely to report having ever had sex, but this diﬀerence
is not significant (Panel B, Row 2, Column 2: 0.12 × (−0.329) = −0.04). The OLS results are
indistinguishable from the 2SLS results.
The large conformity in behavior observed among girls applies not only to sexual activity,
but also to condom use. While the probability that a girl reports ever having had sex but never
having used a condom does not increase significantly with the share of treated girls in her school
(Columns 3 and 4), the share of girls who report ever having protected sex is 7 percentage points
higher (0.14× 0.476) in schools with the average share of treated girls compared to schools with
no treated girls (Column 6).
6.2.2 Price Eﬀects
In Table 10, the coeﬃcients of the price eﬀects can be found in Row 2 in Panel A and Row 1 in
Panel B.
First we see that treated boys are avoiding sex with untreated girls. Indeed, in schools with
a higher proportion of treated boys, girls are less likely to be sexually active (Panel A, Row 2,
Column 2). In terms of the model presented in Section 3, this finding suggests that treated boys
consider that secondary school girls pose a high risk (that they are Type 1).
Second, in schools with a high share of treated girls, boys are more likely to be sexually
active than boys in schools with a low share of treated girls (Panel B, Row 1, Column 2). In a
school with the average share of treated girls (0.14), teenage boys are 11 percentage points more
likely to have had unprotected sex than teenage boys in a school with no treated girls (Panel
B, Row 1, Column 4). This diﬀerence is significant at the 90 percent confidence level. This
result is also consistent with the model: girls who have received information on relative risks
are requesting lower transfers from teenage boys (for unprotected sex) than girls who did not
receive the information.
6.3 Spillover Discussion
Given that the information campaign had an indirect impact on the untreated through both
peer and price eﬀects within secondary schools, it is possible that similar spillover eﬀects could
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have been at play across primary schools. On one hand, information on relative risks could
have spread to comparison primary schools that are near treatment schools, and girls in those
comparison schools may also have avoided unprotected sex with adult partners. This would
mean that the treatment eﬀect on childbearing estimated in Section 5.1 is an underestimation
of the overall eﬀect of the information campaign. On the other hand, if adult men responded to
the change in price charged by treated teenage girls by moving away from treatment schools and
towards the surroundings of comparison schools when looking for sex partners, the information
campaign may have generated an increase in childbearing by adult men in the comparison
schools, and consequently the comparison between treatment and comparison schools would be
overestimating the treatment eﬀect. Considering the fact that the treatment group is more than
4 times smaller than the comparison group, it is unlikely that this price eﬀect could explain
more than a fourth of the treatment eﬀect found in Section 5.1.
7 Conclusion
I used a randomized information campaign to study the change in the sexual behavior of Kenyan
teenagers in response to information on the relative risk of HIV infection by type of partner.
Providing this information led to a 65% decrease in the incidence of pregnancies by the older
(riskier) partners among teenage girls in the treatment group relative to the comparison group
and triggered an increase in self-reported condom-protected sexual activity among teenagers with
partners their own age, suggesting a substitution eﬀect. These results suggest that teenagers are
responsive to information on relative risks and that, overall, the information campaign helped
teenagers reduce their risk of HIV infection. In contrast, a program that provided general
information about the risk of HIV but did not inform teenagers of the risk distribution in the
population had no impact on sexual behavior, as measured by pregnancy rates.
The findings of this paper have important implications. Public health interventions often
focus their eﬀorts on the extensive margin of a risky behavior: they aim at the complete elimi-
nation of the behavior and urge complete abstention from the activity. Accordingly, they rarely
provide information on the relative riskiness of diﬀerent varieties of a risky activity — information
that would enable people to reduce the intensity of their exposure to risk while remaining active.
But the amount of information that a prevention campaign should provide in order to maximize
its health impact depends on the relative size of two elasticities: the elasticity between high- and
low-risk varieties of an activity and the elasticity between the low-risk variety and no activity at
all. The empirical evidence presented in this paper suggests that, in the case of sexual behavior,
the former is larger than the latter. This result suggests that HIV education campaigns may
achieve a wider health impact if they include both risk reduction and risk avoidance information.
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Further work to assess the overall welfare implications of providing information on relative risks
will be important in order to allow governments, as well as health and education specialists, to
design the most eﬀective information campaigns.
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8 Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1
The true prevalence rates are: p on average, pB among teenage boys and pA among adult men,
ranked as follows: pB < p < pA. The beliefs are denoted: p˜, p˜B and p˜A. I compare partnership
formation under three sets of information:
1. In Set 1, the beliefs are p˜A = p˜B = p˜ and p˜ < p, defined such that unprotected sex
between G and A dominates protected sex between G and B: WA ≥ p˜tH + C −WY and
WA ≥ ep˜tH+eC+WY −D. Thus under Information Set 1 G always engages in unprotected
sex with A.
2. In Set 2, the beliefs are p˜A = p˜B = p˜ = p.
3. In Set 3, the beliefs are p˜A = pA, p˜B = pB, and p˜ = p.
Proof.
I poseWH =
⎧
⎨
⎩
C + pAtH −WY if {2WY − C − p˜BtH < 0 and 2WY − (1− e)[C + p˜BtH]−D < 0}
(pA − pB)tH +WY if 2WY −C − p˜BtH ≥ 0 and p˜B ≤ D−eCetH
(pA − (1− e)pB)tH + eC +WY −D if 2WY − (1− e)[C + p˜BtH]−D ≥ 0 and p˜B > D−eCetH
⎫
⎬
⎭
and I poseWL =
⎧
⎨
⎩
C + ptH −WY if {2WY −C − p˜BtH < 0 and 2WY − (1− e)[C + p˜BtH]−D < 0}
WY if 2WY − C − p˜BtH ≥ 0 and p˜B ≤ D−eCetH
eptH + eC +WY −D if 2WY − (1− e)[C + p˜tH]−D ≥ 0 and p˜B > D−eCetH
⎫
⎬
⎭
• If 2WY −C − p˜BtH < 0 and 2WY − (1− e)[C+ p˜BtH]−D < 0, G engages in unprotected
sex with A if WA ≥ C + p˜AtH −WY (Inequality 1).
— Under Information Set 2, Inequality 1 is true only if WA ≥WL since p˜A < pA.
— Under Information Set 3, Inequality 1 is true only if WA ≥WH since p˜A = pA.
— The minimum compensation that G can extract under set 2 is P2 = C + ptH −WY ,
which is lower that the minimum compensation that she can extract under set 3
(P3 = C + pAtH −WY ) since p < pA.
• If 2WY − (1− e)[C+ pBtH]−D ≥ 0 and pB > D−eCetH and 2WY − (1− e)[C+ ptH]−D < 0
:
— Under Information Set 2, G engages in unprotected sex with A ifWA ≥ C+ptH−WY ,
which is true only if WA ≥WL since p < pA.
— Under Information Set 3, G engages in unprotected sex with A if WA − pAtH −
C ≥ WY − D − (1 − e)C − (1 − e)pBtH, which is true only if WA ≥ WH since
WH = (pA − (1− e)pB)tH + eC +WY −D.
— The minimum compensation that G can extract under Set 2 is P2 = C + ptH −WY .
The compensation that she can extract under Set 3 is P3 = (pA − (1 − e)pB)tH +
eC +WY −D. We see that P3 > P2 ⇐⇒ [2WY − (1− e)[C + pBtH]−D] + pAtH >
ptH −WY =⇒ pAtH > ptH since the first term on the left-hand side is positive and
the second term on the right-hand side (−WY ) is negative. Since pA > p,we can infer
that P3 > P2.
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• If 2WY − (1− e)[C + ptH]−D ≥ 0 and pB > D−eCetH :
— Under Information Set 2, G engages in unprotected sex with A if WA ≥ eptH+ eC+
WY −D which is true only if WA ≥WL since pA − pB − e(p− pB) ≥ 0.
— Under Information Set 3, G engages in unprotected sex with A if WA ≥ (pA − (1 −
e)pB)tH + eC +WY −D which is true only if WA ≥WH .
— The minimum compensation that G can extract under Set 2 is P2 = eptH+eC+WY −
D. The compensation that she can extract under Set 3 is P3 = (pA− (1− e)pB)tH +
eC+WY −D. We see that P3 > P2 ⇐⇒ pA−(1−e)pB > ep⇐⇒ pA−pB > e(p−pB)
which is always true since e ≤ 1 and pA > p.
• If 2WY −C − pBtH ≥ 0 and pB ≤ D−eCetH and 2WY −C − ptH < 0 and 2WY − (1− e)[C +
ptH]−D ≥ 0:
— Under Information Set 2, G engages in unprotected sex with A if WA ≥ eptH+ eC+
WY −D which is true only if WA ≥WL since pA − pB − e(p− pB) ≥ 0.
— Under Information Set 3, G engages in unprotected sex with A if WA − pAtH −C ≥
WY − pBtH − C, which is true only if WA ≥WH since WH = (pA − pB)tH +WY .
— The minimum compensation that G can extract under Set 2 is P2 = eptH+eC+WY −
D. The compensation that she can extract under Set 3 is P3 = (pA − pB)tH +WY .
We see that P3 > P2 ⇐⇒ (pA − pB)tH > eptH + eC −D. Since eC −D ≤ epBtH,
P3 > P2 =⇒ (pA − pB) > e(p− pB) which is always true since e ≤ 1 and pA > p.
• If 2WY −C − pBtH ≥ 0 and pB ≤ D−eCetH and 2WY −C − ptH < 0 and 2WY − (1− e)[C +
ptH]−D < 0:
— Under Information Set 2, G engages in unprotected sex with A ifWA ≥ C+ptH−WY
which is true only if WA ≥WL.
— Under Information Set 3, G engages in unprotected sex with A if WA − pAtH −C ≥
WY − pBtH − C, which is true only if WA ≥WH since WH = (pA − pB)tH +WY .
— The minimum compensation that G can extract under Set 2 is P2 = C + ptH −WY .
The compensation that she can extract under Set 3 is P3 = (pA − pB)tH +WY . We
see that P3 > P2 ⇐⇒ 2WY − C − pBtH > (p − pA)tH which is always true since
2WY − C − p˜BtH ≥ 0 and p− pA < 0.
• If 2WY −C − ptH ≥ 0 and p ≤ D−eCetH :
— Under Information Set 2, G engages in unprotected sex with A if WA ≥WY which is
true only if WA ≥WL.
— Under Information Set 3, G engages in unprotected sex with A ifWA ≥ (pA−pB)tH+
WY which is true only if WA ≥WH .
— The minimum compensation that G can extract under Set 2 is P2 = WY . The com-
pensation that she can extract under Set 3 is P3 = (pA − pB)tH +WY . We see that
P3 > P2 since pA > pB.
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• Thus if WA ≥WH , G’ behavior is identical under all information sets (she always engages
in unprotected sex with A). However, since P3 > P2,the compensation that G can extract
under Set 3 is higher than the compensation she can extract under Set 2 (assuming a
similar bargaining structure under each set of information).
33
Fi
gu
re
 1
H
IV
 P
re
va
le
nc
e 
by
 G
en
de
r 
an
d 
A
ge
 G
ro
up
s, 
K
en
ya
3
9
12
.9
11
.7
11
.8
9.
5
3.
9
0.
4
2.
4
7.
3
6.
6
8.
4
8.
8
5.
2
02468101214
15
-1
9
20
-2
4
25
-2
9
30
-3
4
35
-3
9
40
-4
4
45
-4
9
A
ge
 G
ro
up
Fe
m
al
e
M
al
e
%
 H
IV
 P
os
iti
ve
S
ou
rc
e:
 K
en
ya
 D
em
og
ra
ph
ic
 a
nd
 H
ea
lth
 S
ur
ve
y,
 2
00
3
34
 
 
Figure 2 
 
If low-prevalence men are poor and high-prevalence men are rich, an increase in the average 
perceived prevalence of HIV infection (pp) decreases the incidence of unprotected sex but 
increases the average riskiness of unprotected sexual partnerships that are formed: the pool of 
men who are competitive on the unprotected sex market under the belief pp=pbar (Pool B) is more 
infectious than the pool of men who are competitive under the belief pp=0 (Pool A). Under the 
belief pp=pA, no man can provide sufficient compensation for the risk. 
N, Number of Men willing to pay W 
S, Number of Teenage Girls willing to engage in unprotected sex if receive transfer W 
Pool A 
HIV Prevalence among Men 
    p 
Pool B       
W
 
 
 
 
S (W, pp=pbar) S (W, pp=0) 
N 
S (W, pp=pA) 
Pool A (pp=0) 
Pool B (pp=pbar)      
WH
Men’s willingness to pay 
               W 
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gTable 1
Baseline Knowledge and Behavior
Girls Boys
(1) (2)
Panel A: Knowledge, Attitudes and Practice (Self-reported)
Average Age 15.1 15.5
(1.2) (1.5)
Percent thinking condoms can prevent pregnancy 0.46 0.71
Percent thinking condoms can prevent HIV infection 0.45 0.66
Percent thinking older people are more likely to infect them younger people 0.29 0.25
Percent reporting having had sex 0.21 0.48
Percent reporting that some girls in the class have a partner who is not a student 0.61 0.57
Percent reporting having a partner above 20 years of age 0.02 0.02
Number of observations 1176 1246
Number of schools 69 69
Panel B: Fertility Survey (Reported by former classmates)
Percent married 0.059 0.007
Percent who has begun childbearing 0.064 N/A
Number of observations 4800 4853
Panel C: Partnership Survey (Interviews with girls who started childbearing)
Age of teenage girl at time of follow-up (in years) 16.44
(1.21)
Age of male partner at time of follow-up (in years) 22.00
(4.23)
Age difference between partners > 5 years (% "yes") 0.44
Age difference between partners > 10 years (% "yes") 0.10
Percent reporting that the partnership was consensual 0.99
Percent reporting that the pregnancy was wanted 0.13
Percent reporting that the male partner made regular cash payments to the teenage 0.76
   prior to the pregnancy
If any cash payment was made, average monthly payment made to the teenage girl 5.86
   (in US$) (7.08)
Percent reporting that the male partner is currently providing financial support to the 0.74
     teenage girl
Percent married if age difference < 5 years 0.42
Percent married if  5 years <age difference <10 years 0.63
Percent married if age difference > 10 years 0.79
Number of Observations 286
Notes: Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. Panel A: Self-reported data collected among teenagers 
enrolled in Grade 8 in 2004, prior to the program. The survey was self-administered. Panel B: outcomes for 
students in Pre-Treatment Cohort (enrolled in Grade 8 in 2003), collected through school visits in the fall 2004. 
Panel C: Childbearing data collected in August 2005 for teenage girls initially enrolled in a comparison school in 
2004,  and who had begun childbearing before July 2005. In 55% of cases, the teenage girl was interviewed 
herself; in the rest of cases, she was not at home on the day of the enumerator's visit and a relative answered 
questions on her behalf.
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Table 2
Average School Characteristics and Students Outcomes at Baseline,
by Treatment Group
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment Comparison Difference
Group Group T-C
Panel a. School Characteristics
Class Size 35 38 -3.799**
(1.55)
Pupils sex ratio (Girls/Boys) 1.11 1.07 0.041
(0.07)
Teacher-pupil ratio 0.026 0.026 0.000
(0.00)
Teachers sex ratio (Females/Males) 0.92 1.03 -0.112
(0.12)
KCPE results (2003) 249 251 -2
(4)
Received Teacher Training on HIV curriculum 0.493 0.498
Panel b. Outcomes at the end of 2004: Girls enrolled in 8th grade in 2003
Percent repeating class 8 0.22 0.25 -0.03
(0.02)
Percent in Secondary School 0.47 0.46 0.01
(0.03)
Percent in Professional Training 0.04 0.04 0.00
(0.01)
Percent out of School 0.27 0.24 0.03
(0.02)
Percent married 0.073 0.059 0.014
(0.01)
Percent who has begun childbearing 0.060 0.064 -0.004
(0.01)
Panel c. Outcomes at the end of 2004: Boys enrolled in 8th grade in 2003
Percent repeating class 8 0.22 0.23 0.00
(0.022)
Percent in Secondary School 0.51 0.52 -0.02
(0.027)
Percent in Professional Training 0.01 0.02 -0.01
(0.005)
Percent out of School 0.25 0.23 0.03
(0.022)
Percent married 0.006 0.007 -0.001
(0.004)
Number of Girls 1215 4800 6015
Number of Boys 1235 4853 6088
Number of Schools 71 252 323
These are school averages. School characteristics collected in 2004. Students outcomes collected in 2004 for the 
pre-treatment cohort (Grade 8 of 2003). Standard errors in parenthesis. Significantly different than zero at 99 (***), 
95 (**), and 90 (*) percent confidence.
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Table 3
Current Status of Teenagers in the Treatment Cohort,
by Treatment Group
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment Comparison Difference
Group Group T-C
Panel a. Situation in July 2005: Girls enrolled in 8th grade in 2004
Percent repeating class 8 0.215 0.238 -0.024
(0.023)
Percent in Secondary School 0.441 0.441 0.000
(0.026)
Percent in Professional Training 0.048 0.043 0.005
(0.009)
Percent out of School 0.291 0.263 0.028
(0.02)
Panel b. Situation in July 2005: Boys enrolled in 8th grade in 2004
Percent repeating class 8 0.194 0.222 -0.027
(0.021)
Percent in Secondary School 0.481 0.463 0.018
(0.026)
Percent in Professional Training 0.033 0.037 -0.003
(0.008)
Percent out of School 0.282 0.264 0.018
(0.023)
Number of Girls 1279 5382 6661
Number of Boys 1378 5721 7099
Number of Schools 71 254 325
These are school averages. Data is missing for 3 comparison schools.
Standard errors in parenthesis. Significantly different than zero at 99 (***), 95 (**), and 90 (*) percent
confidence.
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Table 7
Overall Treatment Effect on Incidence of Childbearing by Adult Men
Comparison 
Group 
Base=100
Treatment 
Group # Averted
Treatment 
Effect
# Observed Teen Pregnancies 100 68.6 31.4 -31.4%
Share of Observed Pregnancies by Adult Men 48% 24% -23.2%
# Observed Pregnancies by Adult Men 47.6 16.7 30.9 -64.8%
# Observed Pregnancies by Young Men 52.4 51.9 0.5 -1.0%
Share of Cross-Generational Pregnancies among Averted Pregnancies 98%
Notes: Treatment = Relative Risks Information Campaign. First row: treatment effect on number of teen pregnancies 
reported from Table 5 (-0.17/0.53). Second row: treatment effect on share of pregnancies by adult men reported from 
Table 6, regression (3).
Table 8
Cost-Effectiveness of the Relative Risks Information Campaign
Kenyan
Shillings
 
US$
Panel A: Program Costs
Program Officer Salary 35,000             467            
Video and Power Equipment Rental 17,490             233            
Transportation costs 84,000             1,120         
Overhead (5%) 6,825               91              
TOTAL COST 143,315         $1,911
Panel B: Cost-Effectiveness
Total # of pregnancies averted 22
Cost per Pregnancy Averted $86
# of cross-generational pregnancies averted 22
Cost per Cross-Generational Pregnancy Averted $86
Scenario 1
# of Primary HIV Infections Averted among Teenage Girls 5.53
Cost per Primary HIV Infection Averted among Teenage Girls $346
Scenario 2
# of Primary HIV Infections Averted among Teenage Girls 3.32
Cost per Primary HIV Infection Averted among Teenage Girls $576
Scenario 3
# of Primary HIV Infections Averted among Teenage Girls 1.11
Cost per Primary HIV Infection Averted among Teenage Girls $1,729
Assumption in scenario 1: 25 cases of HIV infection per 100 cross-generational pregnancies
Assumption in scenario 2: 15 cases of HIV infection per 100 cross-generational pregnancies
Assumption in scenario 3: 5 cases of HIV infection per 100 cross-generational pregnancies
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ra
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 p
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 c
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 c
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